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ABSTRACT
Epstein compares models of group agents that focus on their internal organization 
to models that focus on the statuses they have. He argues that status models are 
inadequate because agency is not something that can be attributed by fiat. Even 
if this is true, however, certain agential powers can be attributed to group agents. 
I argue that Epstein’s arguments stand to benefit a lot from recognizing that 
some group agents have statuses and constitute corporate agents. For instance, 
only corporate agents can exist without having members.
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In the past few decades, social ontology has established itself firmly as a 
thriving discipline within philosophy. The discipline addresses a wide range 
of topics that includes but is not limited to joint action, group agency, and 
social institutions. A number of philosophers including Michael Bratman, 
Margaret Gilbert, Philip Pettit, John Searle, and Raimo Tuomela have put 
forward theories about such phenomena.1 In his book The Ant Trap Brian, 
Epstein takes a step back and scrutinizes the methodologies that philos-
ophers such as these employ. Epstein’s main complaint is that these phi-
losophers pursue a one-size-fits-all strategy. As a consequence, they are 
not sufficiently sensitive to the diversity of social phenomena. Furthermore, 
they often fail to recognize that the philosophical questions that should be 
asked are diverse and that the theories on offer cannot answer all of them. 
This message is more than welcome. Epstein’s criticisms are perceptive and 
powerful. I hope that they will inspire people working on these topics to 
1These philosophers are sometimes referred to as ‘the Big Five’ (Chant, Hindriks, and Preyer 2014).
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develop richer theories with a clearer conception of which questions these 
theories can and cannot answer.
Epstein’s book concerns the ontology of social entities. A central question 
about the ontology of money is this: Why are certain pieces of paper dollar 
bills? In response, one might specify the conditions that a piece of paper has 
to meet in order to be money in the United States. Such an answer attempts 
to specify the grounding conditions of money, and should, for instance, 
involve a reference to the Federal Reserve. Epstein argues forcefully that 
there is a further question to ask: Why are these the grounding conditions for 
money in that context? A possible answer to this question concerns collec-
tive acceptance of a rule that features the conditions specified. Epstein refers 
to such conditions as anchoring conditions. He argues that the distinction 
between grounding and anchoring conditions has been ignored, and that 
it demands our attention. He goes on to develop a rigorous perspective on 
the distinction. As Epstein (2016) notes, most commentators focus on this 
issue (Guala 2016). In light of this, I will focus on other aspects of Epstein’s 
view and address a number of the claims he makes about social groups (see 
note 5 for a comment on grounds and anchors).
In Chapters 17 and 18, Epstein discusses two kinds of models of group 
agents: social integrate models and status models. Whereas the former 
focus on the way individuals can come to form an integrated whole, the 
latter zoom in on the powers or statuses that people attribute to particular 
collections of individuals. List and Pettit (2011) have proposed an influen-
tial social integrate model. Searle (1995, 2010) is a proponent of the status 
approach. Epstein is quite critical of status models. As he understands these 
models, they attribute agency – in my terminology – by fiat. This certainly 
is a problematic idea. Epstein is right to point out that a full-blown group 
agent is, in his terms, ‘a system of practical activity’ (265, 272).2 And this is 
not a property that can be attributed by fiat. Instead, it requires an appro-
priate internal organization. At least Searle’s version of the status model is 
silent on this core feature of group agents, and is as a consequence Searle 
is vulnerable to Epstein’s criticism.
I will argue, however, that status models are of crucial importance for appre-
ciating a distinction between kinds of group agents. Some group agents can 
be exhaustively characterized in terms of their internal organization. Other 
group agents are not only appropriately organized, but they also have a status 
that is recognized by agents external to the group agent at issue. I refer to 
such agents as ‘corporate agents’ (Hindriks 2008). Corporate agents include, 
2unless otherwise indicated, pages numbers pertain to Epstein (2015).
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for instance, universities and corporations. The status of a corporate agent 
bears on the kind of activities it can undertake, such as conferring a degree on 
a student or issuing stock. Thus, status models can capture an important fea-
ture that many group agents in contemporary societies have. Epstein fails to 
appreciate the way in which integrate models and status models can be seen 
as complementary. I go on to discuss his worry that people might attribute 
statuses to collections of individual agents that do not form an appropriate 
system of practical activity. At least at first sight, it seems implausible that such 
collections of individuals are group agents. Even though this worry needs to 
be taken seriously, I argue that statuses can in fact be assigned to collections 
of individuals that are not full-blown group agents.
1. Integrate models
Social integrate models characterize groups and group agents, as I will say, 
‘from the inside’ (Hindriks 2008). They model groups as collections of indi-
viduals that are in some sense integrated. As Epstein discusses, collections 
of individuals might, for instance, form shared or joint intentions. Roughly 
speaking, Bratman argues that people who share an intention each intend 
that they perform an action and they do so in part because the other has 
the same intention. On Gilbert’s view, a joint intention consists of a joint 
commitment to do something that a collection of individuals has formed. 
Those who share an intention form a group.
It is not obvious to me, however, that they also form a group agent. Given 
his reductive account Bratman (2014) is certainly not committed to this. And 
although Gilbert provides a non-reductive account of joint intentions, it is 
not at all clear that she is committed to the claim that the groups she is 
concerned with are group agents that have a distinct ontological status. One 
reason to be cautious in this respect is that the groups at issue can have a 
fleeting existence. Two people who go for a walk together, to use Gilbert’s 
favorite example, might never form another joint commitment again. In light 
of this, it might be more attractive to adopt a more demanding conception of 
group agency. The view I favor is, roughly, that a group agent is a collection 
of individuals that has collectively accepted a decision procedure for mak-
ing decisions together. The fact that such a procedure is in place provides a 
basis for acting together on a systematic basis. In light of this, it is plausible 
to regard groups that have adopted a decision procedure as group agents.
As Epstein presents them as proponents of social integrate models, he 
interprets their theories as accounts of group agents. List and Pettit (2011) 
present an account of group agency that centers on collective decision 
procedures. Epstein discusses this account briefly and critically in chapter 
14, but he does not return to it. To be sure, Epstein does discuss Tuomela’s 
view and Tuomela regards group agents as authority systems, which requires 
them to have a decision procedure. However, this feature of Tuomela’s pro-
posal hardly gets any attention. The issue is important to Epstein’s project, 
because he regards group agents as systems of practical activity. The groups 
with which Bratman and Gilbert are typically concerned with do not qualify 
as such, I believe, exactly because they do not involve collective decision 
procedures. In light of this, it would be interesting to know more about 
how Epstein conceives of group agents as systems of practical activity. Even 
though he is critical of List and Pettit, it seems that such an account would 
have to address the paradoxical features of collective rationality and collec-
tive decision-making that they are concerned with – in particular the fact 
that individual contributions to a collective decision-making process can 
easily give rise to collective decisions that are inconsistent.
Epstein is concerned with other issues. His complaint is that social inte-
grate models such as these try to do too much when it comes to answer-
ing questions about ontology: ‘they assume that the thing that constitutes 
the group must do all the explanatory work about properties of the group’ 
(260). Epstein qualifies this as ‘a damaging structural assumption’ (258). The 
problem is that ‘these theories continue to identify groups too closely with 
their constitutions’ (260). Epstein’s objection is that an account such as that 
of Gilbert might be plausible as an account of what a group agent is, but 
that it fails to answer other ontological questions such as:
When is a new joint commitment merely an added commitment to an existing 
group, and when does it issue in a distinct group? (260–61)
Membership changes, for instance, are awkward to deal with on an account like 
Gilbert’s. … [When a new person joins, does] the old group go out of existence 
and a new one come into existence? (260)
Thus, Gilbert’s account is limited because, even if it adequately captures 
the way (some) group agents are constituted, it fails to answer questions 
about other important ontological issues such as coinciding groups, and 
membership change.
I am not sure how substantial Epstein’s challenge is. First of all, the philos-
ophers at issue might try and answer the questions Epstein asks in terms of 
the very accounts they have proposed. Gilbert might, for instance, say that 
if someone joins an existing commitment, then the old group is enlarged 
whereas if the relevant individuals form a new commitment they form a 
new group. What counts as a new commitment depends on its content, 
and possibly on whether other members concur on adjusting an existing 
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commitment so as to include a new member. The account she has developed 
allows her to say this, and it is not obvious to me that she needs to say more.
Secondly, as I have suggested earlier, perhaps these are accounts of groups 
rather than group agents. If so, they might not have to answer the questions 
Epstein asks. To be sure, those questions could be voiced with respect to 
accounts such as those of List and Pettit, or my own for that matter (Hindriks 
2008, 2012, 2013). However, such accounts seem to be well placed to answer 
them. Membership change might, for instance, be settled by the collective 
decision procedures that lie at the heart of such accounts. A statute of a group 
agent might specify the criteria for its individuation, thereby providing an 
answer as to when a group agent coincides with it and when it is distinct. On my 
account, collective decision procedures and statutes can play these roles when 
the members of the group agent at issue have collectively accepted them.
2. Status models
Status models concern the assignment of statuses to group agents. A uni-
versity, for instance, is an organization that has a designated educational 
status. That status is recognized widely and such recognition is necessary 
for a university to function as such. Students will not enroll without it. More 
fundamentally, in the absence of recognition by the government, an organ-
ization will not be legally allowed to confer university degrees. In light of 
the role that agents outside of the organization play in this regard, I have 
suggested that status models characterize group agents ‘from the outside’ 
(Hindriks 2008).3
Perhaps the most well-known status model has been proposed by Searle 
(1995). On his view, people attribute a status to an entity, which can thereby 
perform some function, which is why Searle uses the term ‘status function’. 
The attributed status function comes with deontic powers, such as the right 
to confer degrees or issue stock. Epstein characterizes Searle’s view as fol-
lows: ‘[S]ome groups are agents because we assign them the status of being 
agents, rather than because they have the right structure. This is roughly 
Searle’s approach’ (264). What is striking about this characterization is that 
Epstein takes Searle to be concerned not with the assignment of particular 
statuses, but with the assignment of agency as such.
Epstein’s complaint about status models is that agency is not a status that 
something can have simply because it has been attributed to it (270). He 
3It should be noted, however, that statuses also play important roles within organizations. The tasks and 
roles that people take on can be seen as statuses, as they enable or require people who have the relevant 
status to perform certain actions (or refrain from doing so).
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argues that it ‘does not really make sense to say that we assign to a collective 
the status being an agent, having an intention, or taking an action’ (265). To 
be sure, Epstein recognizes that some groups ‘like courts and legislatures 
seem to be able to intend, act, and so on, despite poor integration among 
the members’ (264). Even so, he insists that groups need to have some appro-
priate internal structure to be agents: ‘Even “corporate agents” need to realize 
systems of practical activity, in order to plan, act, or have intentions. … But 
in no case does it make sense to see agency or the ability to act as assigned, 
authorized, or projected’ (265). Epstein goes on to argue that, when a group 
realizes a system of practical activity, ‘an additional status assignment is not 
needed, nor does it add anything’ (272, my emphasis).
When Epstein claims that assigning a status to a group that realizes a 
system of practical activity does not add anything, he is most charitably read 
as claiming that the group is a group agent due to the fact that it realizes a 
system of practical activity, and assigning a status to it does not have any 
bearing on this. Even so, it is important to appreciate that assigning a status 
to a group agent can add things of great significance. Organizations that 
are legally recognized can file lawsuits. Recognizing those who undertook a 
coup in another country as the legitimate government has rather important 
practical and principled consequences that bear directly on whether they 
do indeed constitute a new and legitimate government.
The simplest way to accommodate this insight is to regard status models 
as complementary to social integrate models in the following sense. In order 
to be a group agent, a group needs to be sufficiently well integrated and 
thereby meet the conditions of a suitable social integrate model. What status 
models add to this is that some such group agents have a status as such 
and are thereby also corporate agents. From this perspective, the insight 
that status models provide is that some group agents are corporate agents. 
Now, I regard it as an important task of social ontology to recognize this 
diversity among group agents. In light of his quest against one-size-fits-all 
approaches, it is a pity that Epstein does not appreciate the significance of 
the distinction between mere group agents and corporate agents. In fact, 
he sets corporations and universities aside (269).4 Status models provide 
4Epstein believes ‘that corporations and universities are not the best cases to choose’, because it is unlikely 
‘that they are constituted by and only by people’ (269). He goes on to argue that such agents ‘bear a variety 
of constitutive relations to material things – people, assets, inventory, buildings, property, equipment, 
and more’ (269). On my view, group agents are constituted only by agents (possibly other group agents). 
The other things Epstein mentions can be owned by group agents, but do not constitute them. In this 
respect, group agents are like individual agents that are not constituted by the things they own either. It 
may well be that in some looser sense entities other than agents can be constitutive of a group agent. If 
so, however, they will feature in the favorable conditions for constituting the relevant agent, and will not 
be part of its constitution base (Hindriks 2013).
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an answer to a distinct question concerning the ways in which particular 
group agents are constrained and enabled to act. Even if Epstein is right that 
agency as such cannot be assigned by fiat, it appears that certain abilities 
or deontic powers can be.
3. Statuses without integration?
It is not at all clear that agency can be seen as a status. Epstein objects 
to status models because he believes that agency is not a status. For his 
objection to work, however, proponents of such models must actually sub-
scribe to the view that it is. And it is not at all obvious that they do this. 
This is certainly not what I had in mind when I contrasted status accounts 
to social integrate accounts (Hindriks 2008). Perhaps, however, Searle is 
committed to this. A central component of my own Enactment Account 
of the constitution of group agents is the idea that the members enact 
the actions of a group agent – or nonmembers suitably authorized to do 
so (Hindriks 2013). Those members constitute the group agent. They do 
so only if further conditions are met, most saliently that they collectively 
accept a collective decision procedure. Searle does not specify any such 
requirements.
The general structure of Searle’s account of institutions is that people 
impose statuses (ultimately – to allow for iterated statuses) on something 
that has no institutional status. In light of this, Epstein observes: ‘If we 
assume that corporate agents are created by assigning statuses to sub-
strates, that immediately raises the question, what are the substrates’ (274). 
In an exchange, Barry Smith (Smith and Searle 2003) has pressed Searle on 
this, as some institutional entities do not have an obvious substrate. The 
most convincing case is electronic money. In response, Searle has embraced 
the criticism and accepted the claim that some statuses are not imposed 
on anything (Smith and Searle 2003). Searle extends this idea to corporate 
agents. In his view, statuses such as that of a corporation or a university are 
free-floating statuses that are not imposed on anything. The terms that we 
use for them are, in Searle’s terms, ‘freestanding’ status terms. Now, on the 
assumption that Searle regards them as group agents, he is an appropri-
ate target of Epstein’s criticisms. Given that there is no substrate, there is 
no requirement that corporate agents have a particular internal structure. 
This means that they need not realize a system of practical activity. Hence, 
having a status can come apart from being a group agent in the sense of 
the social integrate models.
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Epstein criticizes status models using a couple of intuition pumps. 
Imagine that we attribute the power to a pendulum ‘to marry a couple 
when it swings to the right, and to divorce the couple when it swings to 
the left’ (270). Or consider the game of spin the bottle in which the direc-
tion in which a bottle points indicates who is owed a kiss. In these cases, 
people attribute powers in a fairly arbitrary manner to objects, arbitrary 
in the sense that the powers are incidentally related to the entities to 
which they are assigned. Epstein goes on to consider the possibility that 
people attribute powers to collections of individuals in the same way – 
perhaps the direction in which three individuals are looking determines 
who is owed a kiss. What these thought experiments are meant to get at is 
the intuition that arbitrarily assigning powers does not constitute agency. 
Now, I have already granted that agency is not a feature that something 
can have simply in it being attributed to that thing. At the same time, it 
should be noted that the powers that agents have could be arbitrary to a 
high degree. The powers at issue are socially constructed. And social con-
struction has relatively few constraints. In light of this, however, Epstein’s 
claim about agency can be reformulated as the claim that agency is not 
a social construction.
In response, I point out that certain agential powers are social constructs. 
Even so, it seems plausible that there are limits to the agential powers that 
can be attributed by fiat. Miller (2001) considers the following two cases. The 
first is based on Peter Sellars’ movie Being There in which a gardener ends 
up being treated and recognized as the president of the United States. At 
some point the gardener is elected as the president, even though he has no 
understanding of the political system and no leadership skills (Miller 2001, 
188). The second case concerns an incompetent surgeon. This person is fully 
accredited as a surgeon, but he is not able to perform a successful operation. 
He has the deontic powers, but not what Miller calls ‘the substantive func-
tionality’ (2001, 186). These cases reveal that there is some leeway insofar as 
the relation between a status and its substrate is concerned. Miller accepts 
that the gardener in the first example really is the president. However, he 
argues that the alleged surgeon is not really a surgeon. Apparently, substan-
tive functionality is a prerequisite for being a surgeon, but not for being a 
president. I am not convinced. The person at issue will be allowed to practice 
as a surgeon, and this may well be the defining feature of being a surgeon. 
Be it as it may, the president example suffices for establishing that it can in 
fact happen that an entity has a status it should not have, because it cannot 
adequately perform the relevant actions.
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This line of thought could be developed so as to argue that collections 
of individuals that do not have the appropriate internal structure can be 
group agents after all. I am reluctant to push the point this far. Making deci-
sions that meet – perhaps fairly minimal – requirements of rationality seems 
integral to our notion of agency. If we reject this option, however, we are 
left with a puzzling possibility. It appears that people can attribute powers 
to act to entities that are not agents. An only loosely connected bunch of 
people might, for instance, have the power to file a lawsuit as a legal entity. 
I suppose that Epstein will reject this possibility. This might, however, be 
too quick. The relevant entities consist of agents. And it can happen, or so 
I propose, that particular individuals cease the opportunity to utilize some 
status for their own purposes acting as if they are members of proper group 
agents. In other words, it might be that statuses assigned to entities that are 
not agents are enacted nevertheless. Status models help us to appreciate 
this unexpected possibility.
Epstein correctly argues that agency is not a status that can be attributed 
to an entity. Furthermore, it makes little sense to attribute a status to an 
entity that is not an agent. However, this does not show that it cannot be 
done. The fact that it makes little sense and is thereby in some sense unde-
sirable is important for the purpose of institutional design. Statuses play an 
important role in social reality because they constrain and enable certain 
forms of behavior. Often such behaviors have a normative dimension in that 
they are permitted, required, or forbidden. Ideally the assignment of a status 
meets certain constraints – e.g. that a surgeon is able to perform surgery 
and that a status be attributed to collections of individuals that do in fact 
form a group agent. What is more, ideally the group agent is particularly well 
placed to realize some social value, such as the creation and dissemination 
of knowledge. In light of this, it is crucially important to carefully specify the 
conditions that an entity has to meet in order to have a status. It would be 
a mistake, however, to regard desiderata as conceptual constraints on the 
statuses that can be attributed to an entity.
4. The ontological significance of corporate agents
The conditions that an entity has to meet in order to have a status are the 
grounding conditions that play a central role in Epstein’s account. One of his 
main claims about the grounding conditions of social entities is that they 
often extend beyond individual agents and their attitudes. When comment-
ing on groups, Epstein claims that ‘facts about a group are not determined 
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just by facts about its members’ (272)5At this point it is important to appreci-
ate that status models are in fact in an excellent position to do justice to this.
In my version of the status model, I distinguish between status rules and 
base rules (Guala and Hindriks 2015; Hindriks and Guala 2015). Status rules 
capture the behavioral dimension of statuses, the powers that come with 
having a certain status. For instance, legal entities such as Limited Liability 
Companies can sue in their own name. Base rules, in contrast, specify the 
basis of a status, its constitution base or substrate – in Epstein’s terms its 
grounding conditions. There is no reason why, in the case of a corporate 
agent, the conditions that a base rule specifies should pertain only to its 
members or their attitudes. A particular collection of individuals can, for 
instance, come to constitute a Limited Liability Company in part because 
the Secretary of State imposes this status on them (Hindriks 2013). On my 
view, a constitutive rule consists of a base rule and a status rule.6
As people that are external to a corporate agent play a crucial role in 
constituting it, status models can be used to provide partial support for 
Epstein’s core claim that groups do not depend on their members only. 
Epstein’s arguments would have benefited from a more extensive and more 
positive appreciation of status models and the conditions under which 
they apply. A number of his arguments seem to apply to corporate agents, 
and to corporate agents only. In light of this, it would have been good had 
Epstein endorsed the distinction between group agents that are corporate 
agents and those are not (even if simply by regarding status models as 
5Epstein defends the stronger claim that some social entities are constituted not only by individual agents 
but also by natural entities. On the basis of this claim, he concludes that ontological individualism is false. 
In response to an earlier formulation of this claim, I have defended ontological individualism. As I failed 
to see what natural factors have to do with holism, I reformulated ontological individualism as the claim 
that ‘social objects and properties are determined (only) by individual and physical objects and properties’ 
(Hindriks 2013). Epstein now clarifies his position by stating that ‘[d]enying ontological individualism does 
not mean endorsing “ontological holism”’ (37). However, what exactly the intermediate position is remains 
unclear. I find it more insightful to take the target of Epstein’s argument to be psychologism – the view 
that social phenomena can be exhaustively determined by individual agents and their attitudes. The 
falsity of psychologism is consistent with ontological individualism (including non-reductive versions 
of individualism).
6Epstein’s core argument in favor of the distinction between grounds and anchors consists of what he calls 
‘a dilemma for constitutive rules’. He argues that a constitutive rule cannot specify the complete set of 
grounds of a social fact. The core problem is that, if a constitutive rule is to specify all the grounding con-
ditions of a social fact, it should refer to the rule itself, in particular to the fact that the rule is collectively 
accepted. This is problematic, Epstein suggests, because it gives rise to an infinite regress. In light of this, 
Epstein rejects conjunctivism, the view that anchors are among the grounds of social facts. However, a 
conjunctivist need not be committed to the claim that a constitutive rule specifies all grounding condi-
tions of a social fact. Instead, he might claim that the grounds consist of a conjunction of conditions X 
and collective acceptance of the rule that specifies these conditions X. To be sure, on this picture there 
is a particular hierarchy between grounding conditions – it is only due to collective acceptance of a par-
ticular rule featuring conditions X that conditions X have to be met. However, pace Epstein (123n11), the 
very fact that there is such a hierarchy does not make the view that collective acceptance is a grounding 
condition incoherent.
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complementary to integrate models, as discussed in Section 2). Consider, 
for instance, his argument that membership in the Supreme Court is deter-
mined by factors external to the collection of individuals who constitute it, in 
particular by the constitution and Judiciary Acts (154, 223). On my account, 
it is exactly because the Supreme Court has a status that figures in the rele-
vant legal documents that its membership is in part externally determined.
Another one of Epstein’s arguments concerns the possibility of group 
agents without members. He imagines a moment in time at which all the 
members of the Supreme Court have resigned, and new justices are to be 
appointed. Epstein maintains that ‘a group is a thing constituted by and only 
by individual people’ (149; emphasis deleted). However, he also argues that 
‘a group can persist even while it has no members at all’ (169). Even though 
this sounds somewhat paradoxical, the two claims are consistent, because 
Epstein holds that ‘groups do not have to be constituted at all times when 
they exist’ (177). In a similar vein, Epstein argues that ‘what qualifies groups 
as material objects … is precisely that they are materially constituted. Groups 
just also have the feature that they do not always have to be materially 
constituted’ (181).7
The point to appreciate is that the Supreme Court can persist without 
members only because it is an institution. A group agent that does not have 
an institutional status dissolves as soon as its members cease to be appropri-
ately integrated. Institutions can exist without being instantiated. Consider 
as another example of an uninstantiated institution the papal interregnum, 
the period between the resignation or death of a pope and the election 
of a new one. The papacy remains in existence even though there is no 
pope during this period. Elsewhere I have argued that this is due to the fact 
that the constitutive rule of this institution remains in place (Hindriks 2013). 
More generally, it is only because these entities are institutional entities that 
involve statuses that they can exist without being constituted in one way 
or another.
The upshot is that a number of Epstein’s arguments presuppose the 
notion of a status. This does not hold, however, for Epstein’s core claim 
about groups – that few if any of them are exhaustively determined by the 
individual members and their attitudes. The very fact that many if not all 
7The question that arises at this point is: What is the ontological status of a group agent that exists without 
being constituted? Epstein considers the option that a group is some kind of abstract object. He rejects this 
and goes on to argue that ‘when the group has no members, there is no object at all’ (170). The problem 
with this answer is that it suggests that there is no-thing at all. That conflicts with Epstein’s claim that 
the groups at issue exist. A more attractive answer, I propose, is that the institution exists as a concrete 
particular without being instantiated.
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group agents employ collective decision mechanisms suffices to make this 
point, as List and Pettit’s (2011) work reveals. As my earlier comments on 
Gilbert’s conception of groups can be taken to suggest, I doubt whether it 
holds for groups that do not employ such a procedure. It may well be that 
such groups are in fact exhaustively determined by the individual members 
and their attitudes. To be sure, Epstein admits that a few groups might be 
‘grounded exclusively by facts about individual people’ (151). Even so, I find 
it striking that this might be true of groups that fit the accounts that feature 
early on in chapter 16, which is supposed to corroborate the claim at issue.
The deeper point that surfaces from this discussion is that how diverse 
the theories must be that we need for answering a diverse set of questions 
depends on the entity under consideration. When it comes to groups, per-
haps the first step to be taken is to distinguish between kinds of groups. And 
when it comes to theories about such groups, it is important – as Epstein 
argues – to carefully attend to the kinds of questions such theories answer. 
Status models are perhaps not particularly useful for answering questions 
about group agency. They are, however, suitable for inquiring into a par-
ticular kind of group agency, corporate agency. This kind of agency is of 
pre-eminent importance for Epstein’s project. For instance, they nicely illus-
trate how the grounding conditions of at least some groups extend beyond 
their members and their attitudes. Furthermore, they are the only group 
agents that can exist without members.
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